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ESSAY 
RECALIBRATING THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM ACT 
CARL TOBIAS* 
Civil justice reform has become increasingly controversial, 
with some observers touting the concept as the best hope for 
the federal courts, and others criticizing the idea as an empty 
gesture that could well increase delay and expense in civil liti-
gation. Vice President Dan Quayle and the American Bar As-
sociation ("ABA") have battled over the issue, with the ABA 
President characterizing the reform as too important to leave to 
the government. 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act 
("CJRA"), a measure which could substantially change the na-
ture of federal civil litigation. 1 One aspect of the CJRA that 
provides evidence respecting the progress of civil justice reform 
is the civil justice expense and delay reduction plans issued in 
late 1991 by the thirty-four federal district courts which the 
Judicial Conference of the United States designated as Early 
Implementation District Courts ("EIDCs"). 
Congress is currently attempting to assess the reforms in-
cluded in these plans, which constitute the initial significant step 
in implementing the CJRA. By some oversight, Congress has 
not invited me to testify. Indeed, Congress has failed even to 
schedule a hearing, despite the growing controversy over civil 
justice reform. I, therefore, must content myself with this 
Essay.2 
The Essay first briefly examines the requirements of the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990 and then analyzes statutory imple-
mentation in the federal districts which have attained EIDC 
status. This evaluation finds that the early reform efforts, while 
*Professor of Law, University of Montana. B.A., Duke University, 1968; LL.B., 
University of Virginia Law School, 1972. I would like to thank Sally Johnson, Peggy 
Sanner, and Tammy Wyatt-Shaw for valuable suggestions; Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte 
Wilmerton for processing this piece; and the Hanis Trust and the Cowley Endowment 
for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1989-1990)). 
2 Apologies to Professor John Hart Ely. See John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted 
a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379, 1379 (1988). 
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prom1smg, have also had less advisable features. The Essay 
concludes with suggestions that Congress should adopt to ame-
liorate these problems.3 
I. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
Congress passed the CJRA in response to claims of abuse in 
the civil litigation process, growing costs and delays associated 
with civil lawsuits, and decreasing access to the federal civil 
justice system.4 For more than a decade and a half, many federal 
judges had expressed concern about a litigation explosion and 
increasing litigation abuse.5 Enactment of the CJRA in 1990 
marked a watershed because Congress had previously rejected 
"most of the judiciary's requests for substantial procedural re-
form in part out of apparent concern that the courts were ap-
plying procedure to undermine substantive statutes."6 
The Act requires that all ninety-four federal district courts 
develop a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan by 
December, 1993. 7 The purpose of the plans is to facilitate the 
adjudication of civil lawsuits "on the merits, monitor discovery, 
improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."8 The courts are to 
promulgate the plans after receiving reports and recommenda-
tions that advisory groups prepare.9 
These advisory groups, which the districts appointed ninety 
days after the statute's passage, were to be "balanced," includ-
3 Although this Essay primarily addresses Congress, much of it applies to other 
individuals and institutions responsible for civil justice reform, such as federal district 
judges and the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
4 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1990, s. 
REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 
6804-05; Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 105, 105-09. 
s See, e.g., Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 
427 U.S. 639, 640-41, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 740-41 (1975). 
6 Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 
24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 1993) (manuscript at 14 n.55, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Tobias, Balkanization]. See generally Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and 
the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 961-63 
(1991) [hereinafter Tobias, Discretion] (suggesting that courts were applying procedure 
to erode substance of statutes). 
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1989-1990). 
8 Id.§ 471. 
9 See id. § 472. 
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ing lawyers as well as persons representative of litigants who 
appear in the courts. 10 Each advisory group must thoroughly 
evaluate the condition of the district's criminal and civil dockets, 
"identify trends in case filings and in the demands being placed 
on the court's resources," and designate the "principal causes 
of cost and delay in civil litigation" that the district experi-
ences .11 The advisory groups, in formulating suggestions, must 
consider the particular needs and circumstances of the court, 
its parties, and their attorneys while ensuring that each contrib-
utes significantly to "reducing cost and delay and thereby facil-
itating access to the courts."12 
The courts, upon receiving the groups' reports and recom-
mendations, must consider the documents and confer with the 
groups and then must consider and may adopt the eleven prin-
ciples, guidelines, and techniques (primarily governing case 
management, discovery, and alternative dispute resolution) 
enumerated in the statute or any other measures which could 
decrease expense and delay. 13 Thirty-four districts issued civil 
justice plans before December 31, 1991, to qualify for designa-
tion as EIDCs. 14 The Judicial Conference Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management officially designated 
those courts as EIDCs on July 30, 1992.15 The next section of 
this Essay evaluates nascent civil justice planning in these 
districts. 
II. EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CJRA 
A. The Implementation Process 
Nearly all of the thirty-four EIDCs, relying on the work of, 
and in consultation with, their advisory groups, seem to have 
10 See id. § 478(b). 
11 Id. § 472(c)(l). 
12 Id. § 472(c)(2)-(3). 
13 See id. §§ 472(a), 473(a)-(b). 
14 See Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 56 
(1992) (listing EIDCs). 
15 See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Parker, Chair, Judicial Conference of the United 
States Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, to Gene E. Brooks, 
Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana (July 30, 
1992) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); Letter from Robert M. Parker, 
Chair, Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Court Administration 
and Case Management to Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge, United States District Court 
for the District of Montana (July 30, 1992) (on file with the Harvard Journal on 
Legislation). 
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undertaken the type of introspection and prescribed the kind of 
procedures that Congress envisioned. Practically every court 
carefully followed the guidance in the CJRA16 and was attentive 
to the statutory goals of reducing expense and delay in civil 
litigation. 
The courts surveyed their civil and criminal dockets and ap-
parently premised procedural provisions only on supporting 
data. 17 These districts considered and adopted, as indicated, the 
statutorily-enumerated principles, guidelines, and techniques, 
especially those covering case management, discovery, and al-
ternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). 18 Some courts closely 
consulted with their advisory groups or conferred with other 
districts. For instance, the Advisory Group for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania was one of the first groups to issue its 
report and recommendations, and those received broad distri-
bution, apparently serving as models for other groups and dis-
tricts .19 Additional courts clearly responded to the recommen-
16 See, e.g., United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Civil 
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan (Dec. 31, 1991) [hereinafter Southern District 
oflndiana Plan] (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, Expense and Delay Reduction Plan (Nov. 18, 
1991) [hereinafter Massachusetts Plan] (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). 
I emphasize the plans, rather than the advisory groups' reports and recommendations 
on which the districts based the plans, because the plans impose procedures that affect 
judges, lawyers, and litigants and because the districts are not required to adopt advisory 
group suggestions. Moreover, nearly every advisory group seems to have followed the 
guidance which Congress provided in § 472 of the Act. For example, the groups promptly 
completed comprehensive assessments of the courts' criminal and civil dockets as 
§ 472(c)(l) requires. See, e.g., Report of the Advisory Group, United States District 
Court for the District of Montana 14-32 (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter Montana Report] (on 
file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); Report of the Advisory Group of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 8-30 (Aug. 1, 
1991), reprinted in 138 F.R.D. 167, 190-212 (1991) [hereinafter Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania Report]. The groups also appear to have followed the suggestions in 
§ 472(c)(l) by identifying trends in case filings and demands imposed on the courts' 
resources, designating the primary causes of expense and delay in civil cases, and 
examining how those could be reduced with better evaluation of the impact of new 
legislation on courts. See, e.g., Report and Proposed Plan of the Advisory Group, 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 2-20 (Dec. 1991) (on 
file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); Final Report from the Advisory Group 
to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 11-49 (Oct. 1, 1991) (on 
file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). 
17 See, e.g., United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Civil Justice 
Reform Act Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 1-4 (Dec. 31, 1991) (on file with the 
Harvard Journal on Legislation); Massachusetts Plan, supra note 16, at 4-13. 
18 See, e.g., Southern District of Indiana Plan, supra note 16, at 3-15; United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction 
Plan 11-17 (Dec. 31, 1991). 
19 See Eastern District of Pennsylvania Report, supra note 16; Telephone Interview 
with Lauren K. Robel, Professor of Law, University of Indiana, Bloomington, and 
Advisory Group Reporter, Southern District of Indiana (Sept. 21, 1992) (noting the 
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dations that their advisory groups forwarded, articulating the 
districts' reasons for accepting or rejecting the suggestions.20 
A smaller number of courts carefully treated numerous issues 
of authority that civil justice reform raises. For example, several 
districts rejected certain of their advisory groups' recommen-
dations, finding that the courts lacked the requisite authority to 
implement the suggestions, while others refused to prescribe 
procedures that would conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or that they had no clear authority to adopt. 21 Some 
courts similarly eschewed reliance on procedures that the Ad-
visory Committee on the Civil Rules proposed as part of a 
comprehensive package of Federal Rules amendments which 
could not become effective until December, 1993, at the 
earliest. 22 
Numerous districts seemed sensitive to related questions of 
implementation. Most courts expressly provided that new pro-
cedures adopted in their civil justice plans would only become 
effective through the regular process for promulgating new, or 
amending presently applicable, local rules. 23 A number of dis-
broad distribution of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania report and recommendations 
and its role as a model). 
20 See, e.g., United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Civil 
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan app. 2 (Dec. 31, 1991) [hereinafter Western 
District of Wisconsin Plan] (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Civil Justice Delay and 
Expense Reduction Plan 14-17, 19-21 (Dec. 27, 1991) [hereinafter Southern District of 
Illinois Plan]. 
21 E.g., Western District of Wisconsin Plan, supra note 20, app. 2, at 2, 6; see also 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Civil Justice Expense 
and Delay Reduction Plan 18 (Dec. 17, 1991) (questioning whether specific authority is 
needed to institute mandatory non-binding court-annexed arbitration) (on file with the 
Harvard Journal on Legislation); United States District Court of the Southern District 
of Florida, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 95 (Nov. 1991) (recognizing 
that court lacked "power to redress the primary factors which cause unreasonable cost 
and delay in" district) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). 
22 See, e.g., Western District of Wisconsin Plan, supra note 20, app. 2, at 2; cf. United 
States District Court for the District of Alaska, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Re-
duction Plan 4 (Dec. 16, 1991) (favoring some form of automatic, mandatory pre-
discovery disclosure and expecting to experiment with mandatory disclosure, but con-
sidering counterproductive an attempt to predict changes involving discovery in Federal 
Rules or in local rules) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). For the 
comprehensive package of Federal Rules amendments, see Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary 
Draft of Proposed Amendments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments 1991). See 
also Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1, 
12 (describing package proposed at April, 1992 meeting of the Advisory Committee on 
the Civil Rules). 
23 See, e.g., United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, 
Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 74 (Dec. 30, 1991) (on file with the 
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tricts apparently attempted to keep their local rules committees 
apprised of, and involved during, the entire planning process, 
and quite a few courts appointed members of these committees 
to their advisory groups. Indeed, the local rules committee for 
the Southern District of Indiana simply served as the advisory 
group. 24 Other courts instituted measures to guarantee, insofar 
as possible, that federal court practitioners would have notice 
that new procedural provisions were effective. 25 
B. Specific Reforms Implemented 
One primary goal of the CJRA is to reduce expense and delay 
in the civil justice system.26 Several districts, accordingly, 
adopted procedures that were expressly intended to address 
these goals, such as placing numerical limitations on interroga-
tories, depositions, and the length of briefs.27 Moreover, the 
Eastern District of Texas, one of the few courts which attempted 
to attack directly the growing expense in civil litigation,28 im-
posed a "maximum fee schedule for contingency fee cases . . . 
Harvard Journal on Legislation); Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan for 
Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 in the District of New Jersey 
17-25 (Dec. 19, 1991) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). 
24 See Southern District of Indiana, Report of the Civil Justice Reform Advisory 
Group i (Dec. 1991) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); Lauren K. Robel, 
Remarks at the Roundtable on Civil Justice Reform, Law & Society Ass'n Annual 
Meeting (May 30, 1992). 
25 See, e.g., Southern District of West Virginia, Plan for Implementation of the Civil 
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 72-73 (Dec. 30, 1991) (on file with the 
Harvard Journal on Legislation); Notice: Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the U.S. District Court for Montana, MONT. LAW., Feb. 1992, at 13; see also 
United States District Court for the District of Montana, Civil Justice Expense and 
Delay Reduction Plan 26-38 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter Montana Plan] (providing proposed 
rule amendments) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). Of course, notice 
to members of the bar within the district may not reach non-members who practice in 
the district. 
26 See supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text. 
27 See, e.g., Southern District of Illinois Plan, supra note 20, at 18 (setting a 20-page 
limit on the length of briefs); United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 7 (Dec. 17, 1991) (limiting 
the number of interrogatories and depositions) (on file with the Harvard Journal 011 
Legislation). 
28 See United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Civil Justice 
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Eastern District of 
Texas Plan] (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). A major purpose for 
passage of the CJRA was to reduce expense. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, the Act specifically instructs advisory groups to insure that the court, liti-
gants, and their counsel contribute significantly to reducing expense. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 472(c)(3); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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of 33% of the total award or settlement," which the court can 
modify in exceptional circumstances.29 
Other districts have adopted less direct, but creative, ap-
proaches to limiting cost and delay. The Montana District, for 
instance, is employing peer review committees comprised of 
federal court practitioners who will review possible discovery 
and litigation abuse at the instigation of judicial officers to de-
termine whether abuse has occurred. 30 The committees could 
reduce the prevalence of discovery disputes and abusive litiga-
tion practices, thereby saving resources of judges, lawyers, and 
litigants. 31 
Some districts are also implementing innovative approaches 
to alternative dispute resolution, which could decrease cost and 
delay. For example, the Western District of Missouri is ran-
domly assigning one-third of its civil caseload automatically to 
a compulsory non-binding ADR program.32 A few courts, in-
cluding the Idaho District and the Northern District of West 
Virginia, are instituting "settlement weeks" in which volunteer 
attorneys trained as mediators or neutrals attempt to settle civil 
cases.33 
The advisory group for the Eastern District of California, in 
response to concerns expressed by local attorneys,34 is experi-
29 Eastern District of Texas Plan, supra note 28, at 7-8. "In cases where statutory 
attorneys' fees are recoverable, such as civil rights cases, the court shall approve a 
reasonable fee." Id. at 8. 
30 See Montana Plan, supra note 25, at 17; Carl Tobias, Federal Court Procedural 
Reform in Montana, 52 MONT. L. REv. 433, 449 (1991). 
31 The judges and some lawyers in the Montana District apparently hold these views. 
I am less sanguine and believe that use of the committees may raise due process 
concerns. See Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 MONT. L. REv. 
91, 97-98 (1992). 
32 See United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Early As-
sessment Program Early Implementation Project 1 (Oct. 31, 1991) [hereinafter Western 
District of Missouri Early Implementation Project] (on file with the Harvard Journal on 
Legislation). Jerome T. Wolf, chair of the advisory group, claims that the cost of delay 
makes the experiment "worth it whether it proves out or not." Randall Samborn, The 
Battle Escalates on Reform, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at l, 29. See generally Kim 
Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 16 low A 
L. REV. 889, 947-57 (1991) (discussing judicial authority to require participation in 
ADR); Tobias, supra note 14, at 49. 
33 See United States District and Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, Expense 
and Delay Reduction Plan 12-13 (Dec. l, 1991) [hereinafter Idaho Plan] (on file with the 
Harvard Journal on Legislation); Report of the Advisory Group to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia 46-47 (Dec. 1991) (discussing 
use of "settlement weeks" since 1987) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). 
I believe that some of the procedures discussed above are problematic as a matter of 
authority or policy. Compare supra note 28 and accompanying text with infra note 47 
and accompanying text. See generally Tobias, supra note 14. 
34 See Report of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group of the United States 
122 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 30:115 
menting with pre-argument notification to counsel by the court 
of the issues to be argued during hearings and with time-tailored 
scheduling of motions.35 The district thereby hopes to reduce 
the amount of time lawyers spend waiting in the courthouse to 
argue motions. 
In addition to the various reforms introduced to reduce ex-
pense and delay, early civil justice planning seems to have af-
forded numerous salutary, and perhaps unanticipated, side ef-
fects.36 The Act instituted an unprecedented nationwide 
experiment which is the first detailed national examination of 
how all ninety-four federal trial courts function. The advisory 
groups and the districts have collected, analyzed, and synthe-
sized a wealth of invaluable data on the courts' day-to-day 
operations. Furthermore, civil justice planning has fostered 
healthy dialogue between the bench and bar and the advisory 
groups in specific districts as well as among advisory groups 
and judges in the ninety-four districts. Planning correspondingly 
appears to have promoted beneficial interaction, especially in-
volving techniques for expeditiously resolving cases, among the 
judges in particular districts. It even seems to have led judicial 
officers in a number of districts to consider how the district qua 
district might improve civil case disposition. 37 
In short, almost every advisory group and federal district 
faithfully followed congressional guidance in the CJRA. They 
closely followed statutory instructions, and they exchanged in-
structive ideas on the Act's implementation and specific pro-
cedures with each other and with additional groups and districts. 
District Court for the Eastern District of California 81, 95, 97 (Nov. 21, 1991) (on file 
with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). 
35 See United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Civil Justice 
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 5-6 (Dec. 31, 1991) (on file with the Harvard Journal 
on Legislation). The Advisory Group's Reporter believes that this example illustrates 
the value of a local district's undertaking self·examination. John B. Oakley, Remarks 
at Roundtable on Civil Justice Reform, Law & Society Ass'n Annual Meeting (May 30, 
1992). 
36 The observations in this paragraph are premised on conversations with numerous 
participants in civil justice reform efforts. See generally Don J. DeBenedictis, An 
Experiment in Reform, 78 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 16 (discussing salutary side effects). 
Of course, once comprehensive data on civil justice reform are systematically gathered, 
assessed, and synthesized, many additional insights will be clear. 
37 I am indebted to Donna Stienstra, Research Division, Federal Judicial Center, and 
John Oakley, Advisory Group Reporter, Eastern District of California, for this idea. 
Professor Oakley believes that the calendaring approach in the federal system, whereby 
individual judges manage cases from filing to disposition, may have artificially isolated 
judges. John Oakley, supra note 35. See generally Robert F. Peckham, The Federal 
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 
69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981) (discussing judicial case management). 
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Moreover, the courts adopted numerous procedures that will 
help achieve the statute's goals of reducing expense and delay, 
while the EIDCs thus far seem to be relatively efficacious lab-
oratories of experimentation. 38 
C. Problems in Implementation 
Although many of the above proposals may prove beneficial, 
several problems have arisen with nascent implementation. 
Some entities involved in civil justice reform have communi-
cated less effectively than they might have. Most districts ne-
glected to establish necessary baselines for measuring the suc-
cess of the reform proposals. Moreover, numerous districts 
apparently did not recognize, or ignored, important problems 
concerning their authority to implement the various reforms. 
Furthermore, because each district was assigned the task of 
suggesting reforms tailored to its own particular needs, the pro-
posals developed have led to considerable interdistrict 
disuniformity. 
1. Communications Between Courts and Advisory Groups 
Some courts seem to have relied minimally on the work of, 
or consulted little with, their advisory groups. For example, 
there apparently was rather limited interaction between the 
judges and the advisory group in the Montana District, and 
virtually no interchange between the federal judges or the ad-
visory group and the local rules committee. Indeed, the judges 
ultimately assumed complete responsibility for drafting the pro-
posed changes in local rules that accompanied the civil justice 
plan. 39 Moreover, the permanent law clerk for the Chief Judge 
served as the advisory group reporter. 40 A number of other 
courts employed similar models by relying substantially on in-
38 Of course, it is too early to ascertain precisely how effective the districts ultimately 
will be. This must await actual application of the procedures prescribed and their 
systematic evaluation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 475. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local 
Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1567 
(1991) (suggesting that experimentation by district courts with inconsistent local rules 
be allowed, employed, and evaluated). 
39 The observations in this sentence and the one above are based on conversations 
with several individuals involved in civil justice planning in Montana and several mem-
bers of the local rules committee. See also Montana Plan, supra note 25, at 26-38. 
40 See Montana Report, supra note 16. 
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ternal court personnel. 41 Such an approach may have restricted 
the exchange between the bench and the bar that Congress in 
the CJRA intended and perhaps compromised the independence 
of some groups. 
2. Establishing Baselines 
Another significant problem with early civil justice planning 
is that only a minuscule number of districts seem to have created 
appropriate baselines relating to expense and delay against 
which to measure progress. A comparatively crude example of 
baselines is the provision in one district for randomly sending 
one-third of its civil cases to a mandatory non-binding ADR 
program. Any expense or delay reduction in those cases could 
then be compared with cost and delay in cases not so assigned. 42 
Without specific baselines, it is exceedingly difficult to ascer-
tain accurately what civil justice planning has achieved. The 
lack of appropriate baselines will also make it difficult for the 
districts to discharge their statutory responsibilities for assessing 
"annually the condition of the court's civil and criminal dockets 
with a view of determining appropriate additional actions that 
may be taken by the court to reduce cost and delay in civil 
litigation and to improve the litigation management practices of 
the court. "43 Moreover, virtually no districts seem to have 
solved the exceedingly difficult problem of establishing expense 
baselines that would answer such problematic questions as the 
meaning of costs and who would bear those costs. 
3. Authority to Implement Reforms 
One of the most difficult and important issues involved in civil 
justice reform is judicial authority to implement procedures 
41 See, e.g., Report of the Western District of Wisconsin Advisory Group, title page 
(Nov. 15, 1991) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); District of Wyoming 
Advisory Group, Report and Recommended Plan (Nov. 1991) (on file with the Harvard 
Journal on Legislation). The other major model was to employ a law professor as 
advisory group reporter. See, e.g., United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana, Report of the Advisory Group on the Reduction of Cost and Delay in Civil 
Cases (Oct. 1991) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); Advisory Group 
for the Eastern District of Virginia, Report of the Civil Justice Reform Act, title page 
(Sept. 19, 1991) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). 
42 See Western District of Missouri Early Implementation Project, supra note 32, at 
1-14. It is relatively easy to establish baselines based on the procedures that existed in 
districts at the time civil justice reform commenced. 
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 475. 
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which are meant to reduce expense or delay. Some districts 
have claimed that they possess very broad authority under the 
CJRA to prescribe procedures which deviate from the Federal 
Rules and the United States Code. A few have even asserted 
that the CJRA provides them carte blanche to adopt any pro-
cedures which will reduce cost or delay, regardless of whether 
they contravene federal requirements. Indeed, the plan for the 
Eastern District of Texas expressly states that "to the extent 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with 
this Plan, the Plan has precedence and is controlling. "44 That 
district promulgated an offer of judgment provision which con-
flicts with both the time limitations of Federal Rule 68 and the 
Rule's requirements governing discrepancies between offers 
made and judgments ultimately secured.45 The court's civiljus-
tice plan also imposed limits on contingency fees46 which may 
interfere with congressional prerogatives to allocate litigation 
costs.47 
Other courts have prescribed procedures that seem inconsis-
tent with the Federal Rules or the United States Code, although 
these districts have been less explicit than the Eastern District 
of Texas. Perhaps the most troubling example has been the 
provision for mandatory pre-discovery disclosure. Twenty 
EIDCs have adopted varying disclosure requirements that re-
semble suggestions to amend the Federal Rules which the Civil 
Rules Committee proposed in 1991. 48 Those recommendations, 
which were vociferously attacked by nearly all segments of the 
bar,49 would dramatically change traditional ideas of, and pres-
ent rules governing, discovery.50 The Committee substantially 
reversed its position twice last spring and eventually prescribed 
proposals similar to the ones initially recommended. 51 Lawyers 
44 Eastern District of Texas Plan, supra note 28, at 9. 
45 See Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 6 (manuscript at 31). Compare Eastern 
District of Texas Plan, supra note 28, at 10 with FED. R. C1v. P. 68. 
46 Eastern District of Texas Plan, supra note 28, at 7-8. 
47 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjourno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) 
(explaining congressional prerogatives to allocate costs). 
48 See, e.g., United States District Court for the District of Delaware, Civil Justice 
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 2-3 (Dec. 23, 1991) (on file with the Harvard Journal 
on Legislation); Report and Plan of the Advisory Group of the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands 36-37 (Dec. 23, 1991) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); 
see also WINTHROP, STIMSON, PUTNAM & ROBERTS, NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF PLAN 
PROVISIONS FOR AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE 1 (1992). 
49 See Samborn, supra note 22, at 1, 12. 
50 See Proposed Amendments 1991, supra note 22, 137 F.R.D. at 83-84, 87-88. 
s1 See Samborn, supra note 22, at 1. 
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across the country are already invoking the discovery disclosure 
provisions promulgated under the CJRA, frequently for tactical 
advantage. 52 
Another illustration of procedures for which courts may lack 
sufficient authority is the Montana district's prescription for 
assigning civil lawsuits co-equally to Article III judges and mag-
istrate judges.53 The court will notify parties whose cases are 
assigned to magistrate judges that they may ask for reassign-
ment, but that right is deemed waived if the requests are not 
filed in a timely fashion. 54 The authority for co-equal assignment 
is unclear, and the provision may contravene procedures for 
securing consent to magistrate jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c).55 
The statutory language and the legislative history of the CJRA 
show that Congress intended for courts to have considerably 
narrower authority to adopt inconsistent provisions than some 
of the districts have asserted. 56 Indeed, the Rules Enabling Act 
provides that local rules are to be "consistent with Acts of 
Congress" and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.57 More-
over, the current version of Rule 83 states that, "in all cases not 
provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may 
52 This observation is based on conversations with numerous attorneys who practice 
in the federal courts. 
53 See Montana Plan, supra note 25, at 3-4; cf United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Arkansas, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 3 (Dec. 
30, 1991) (randomly assigning civil cases on experimental basis to district judges and 
magistrate judges) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); United States 
District Court for the District of Oregon, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction 
Plan 20 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter Oregon Plan] (explaining that the objective of case 
assignment procedures is to incorporate all full-time magistrate judges into a "civil case 
assignment system on a co-equal basis with the district judges") (on file with the Harvard 
Journal on Legislation); see also Tobias, supra note 31, at 93 n.9 (discussing co-equal 
assignment of cases). 
54 See Montana Plan, supra note 25, at 4. 
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Columbia Record Prods. v. Hot Wax Records, 966 F.2d 
515 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing applicable case law); In re San Vincente Medical Partners, 
865 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Judicial Conference of the United States, Civil 
Justice Reform Act Report, Development and Implementation of Plans by Early lmple· 
mentation Districts and Pilot Courts 5 (June 1, 1992) [hereinafter Judicial Conference 
Report] (Ninth Circuit Review Committee questioning validity of Montana provision 
for co-equal assignment); Tobias, supra note 31, at 93 n.9 (discussing judicial authority 
to so assign cases). 
56 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 4, at 3-31, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6805-35 (legislative history including no indication that Congress 
intended to grant broad authority); Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure (1992) (pains-
takingly analyzing legislative history and showing that Congress intended narrow ambit 
of authority) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
57 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988). See generally Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 6 
(manuscript at 30) (discussing Rules Enabling Act requirements). 
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regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with" the 
Federal Rules.58 Therefore, a number of districts have appar-
ently exceeded their authority. 
This exercise of authority and the inconsistencies thus created 
can have detrimental ramifications. Most significantly, proce-
dures adopted under the CJRA can lead to conflicts between 
local and federal procedural provisions, thereby implicating del-
icate interbranch relationships of Congress and the federal ju-
diciary. For example, when districts adopt local procedures that 
contradict federal requirements, this can enhance the judiciary's 
power at the expense of Congress and litigants, such as civil 
rights plaintiffs, whose vindication of substantive rights Con-
gress intended federal courts to facilitate.59 More specifically, if 
local procedures contravene procedural provisions in substan-
tive statutes affording employment discrimination plaintiffs cer-
tain tactical advantages60 or make rigid what are now flexible 
requirements in the Federal Rules, such as several discovery 
rules,61 those conflicts can erode congressional power and dis-
advantage parties whom Congress intended to benefit. 62 
4. Disuniformity Among Districts 
Another significant problem has been each EIDCs promul-
gation of procedures that conflict with ones that other districts 
58 FED. R. C1v. P. 83. The 1991 proposal to amend Rule 83 would have permitted 
experimentation employing inconsistent local rules for periods of less than five years 
with Judicial Conference approval. See Proposed Amendments 1991, supra note 22, 137 
F.R.D. at 152-55. The Standing Committee,- however, recently withdrew that proposal 
in apparent deference to the CJRA efforts. See Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Amendments of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (July 1992). 
59 See Tobias, Discretion, supra note 6, at 961-63; cf. Carl Tobias, Public Law 
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REv. 270 (1989) 
(discussing how narrow judicial application of procedure can enhance the judiciary's 
power). An important reason for this is that Congress does not have the opportunity to 
modify local procedural changes in the same way that it may alter proposed Federal 
Rules amendments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074. See generally Tobias, Balkanization, supra 
note 6 (manuscript at 25) (discussing how local procedural changes bypass Congress). 
60 See Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The 
Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REv. 211 
(1992). Narrow judicial interpretation of such statutes in part prompted passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See generally 
Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801 (1992) (discussing 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
61 See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)-{b); cf. Tobias, supra note 59, at 296-301 (giving 
example of judicial imposition of heightened pleading requirements under Rule 8). 
62 See Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 6. 
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prescribed.63 Congress structured the CJRA in ways that inex-
orably foster some interdistrict disuniformity because each dis-
trict must take into account and may adopt the eleven principles, 
guidelines, and techniques listed in the statute and any other 
procedures which could decrease expense or delay.64 The highly 
inconsistent procedures that the EIDCs have promulgated com-
plicate the efforts of attorneys and parties, such as the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Sierra Club, and General Motors, who 
litigate in multiple districts. All parties and lawyers, but partic-
ularly those with limited resources such as public interest liti-
gants, have difficulty finding, mastering, and conforming to local 
procedures that differ substantially from district to district. 65 
Ill. SUGGESTIONS 
When passing the CJRA, Congress pursued the laudable goals 
of reducing expense and delay in civil litigation through nation-
wide procedural experimentation. Civil justice planning has al-
ready produced an enormous quantity of illuminating data which 
enhances understanding of how the federal courts discharge 
their responsibilities. Congress apparently attempted, however, 
to accomplish more than could be efficaciously achieved at one 
time by employing too many instrumentalities and procedures. 
Congress may have so drafted the legislation that its implemen-
tation could undermine the Act's expressly stated purpose to 
reduce cost and delay. 66 
A general illustration of this statutory complication is the 
Act's placement of primary responsibility for implementation of 
the various reforms in all ninety-four federal districts, many of 
whose advisory groups and judges were effectively working at 
once.67 Because the EIDCs labored simultaneously, few courts 
63 For additional discussion, see id. 
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)-(b). Congress apparently attempted to maintain some uni· 
formity by providing that all districts must consider and may adopt the eleven listed 
procedures. 
65 See Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 6 (manuscript at 38-39). See generally Carl 
Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485 (1988-1989) (dis-
cussing difficulties that resource-deficient litigants confront). 
66 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 472(c)(3); supra notes 4, 8, 12 and accompanying text. 
67 The districts had to appoint all of the advisory groups by the same date, ninety 
days after the Act's passage. 28 U.S.C. § 478(a). The 34 districts seeking EIDC status 
had to issue plans by December 31, 1991. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 103(c). 
Some of the remaining sixty districts issued plans before the end of 1992. See, e.g., 
Letter from Barefoot Sanders, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the North-
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were able to benefit from the experimentation of other districts 
or to evaluate the efficacy of the reforms. Moreover, the statute 
instructs the courts that they must consider and could promul-
gate varying combinations of eleven principles, guidelines, and 
techniques and any additional procedures which promise to de-
crease expense or delay. Indeed, the thirty-four EIDCs have 
already adopted their plans and the remaining districts must 
issue plans by the statutory deadline of December, 1993.68 
These difficulties have fostered considerable confusion among 
the advisory groups and the federal districts. For instance, the 
problems led the Advisory Group for the Eastern District of 
New York to request that the Standing Committee observe a 
"three-year moratorium on affected national rules so that each 
district can have a fair opportunity to assess reforms at the local 
level implemented through" the CJRA. 69 The difficulties have 
also complicated the efforts of lawyers and litigants to under-
stand and comply with the disparate procedures applicable in 
various districts 70 and could frustrate the efforts of certain en-
tities, such as government agencies and public interest groups, 
to monitor civil justice planning and changes in federal civil 
procedure. 71 
Congress must act promptly and decisively to capitalize on 
the civil justice reform efforts which advisory groups and dis-
tricts have undertaken. Experimentation with civil justice re-
form to date has been sufficiently broad and diverse to permit 
the identification of those procedures which have the greatest 
promise. More expansive experimentation may yield minimal 
additional benefit and could even be counterproductive. Con-
gress should evaluate the existing reform efforts and institute 
measures that will maximize the beneficial, and minimize the 
detrimental, features of nascent civil justice planning. Congress 
should recognize that certain elements of the CJRA, although 
em District of Texas, to Carl Tobias (June 5, 1992) (indicating plan would issue in 1992) 
(on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation); cf Civil Justice Expense and Delay 
Reduction Plan for the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
(Apr. 30, 1992) (recently issued plan) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation). 
68 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 103(b). 
69 Letter from Edwin J. Wesely, Chair, Advisory Group for the Eastern District of 
New York, to Robert Keeton, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States 3 (Feb. 13, 1992) (on file with the Harvard 
Journal on Legislation). 
70 See supra notes 59-62, 64-65 and accompanying text. 
71 See Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 6 (manuscript at 12 n.50). 
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well-intentioned, may have posed very real practical problems 
of implementation. 
An efficacious approach would be some form of mid-course 
correction that circumscribes the CJRA' s open-ended character. 
For example, Congress might draw on EIDC experimentation 
to designate a reduced number of procedures with the greatest 
potential for· decreasing expense or delay, such as the setting 
and enforcement of firm trial dates 72 or certain types of voluntary 
ADR,73 and prescribe experimentation with them in relatively 
few districts. Congress should at least limit one of the primary 
parameters: the number of procedures which courts can adopt 
or the number of districts which participate in civil justice 
reform. 
Regardless of how Congress chooses to restrict civil justice 
planning, it must ensure that evaluators assemble, assess, and 
synthesize information about the procedures' efficacy for 
enough time to ascertain which ones are preferable.74 For in-
stance, Congress might consider the twenty EIDCs that are 
currently implementing the highly controversial compulsory pre-
discovery disclosure proposals an adequate number to afford a 
sense of the concept's efficacy. Once these courts have exper-
imented with the technique and observers have systematically 
evaluated the procedure, the federal judiciary and Congress can 
decide if it is practicable and, if so, how widespread its use 
should be. Congress correspondingly ought to discourage the 
remaining districts from employing such discovery, pending 
analysis of its implementation in the EIDCs. This course of 
action should ultimately enable Congress to identify the most 
promising procedures, so that courts might apply them in a 
greater number of districts or even nationally, as indicated.75 
72 See, e.g., Oregon Plan, supra note 53, at 4 (stating that firm trial dates are essential 
to effective case management system); Idaho Plan, supra note 33, at 3 (same); Montana 
Plan, supra note 25, at 14 (same). 
73 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
74 I recognize that Congress has specifically prescribed numerous studies. Each dis-
trict must prepare an annual assessment. 28 U.S.C. § 475. The Judicial Conference 
recently completed a report to Congress on the EIDCs. See Judicial Conference Report, 
supra note 55. What I have in mind is a study like that which the Rand Corporation is 
preparing on the pilot courts program for submission in late 1995. See Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990 § 105(c); supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty 
of assessing efficacy without baselines). 
75 I envision Congress and the courts gradually expanding the number of procedures 
that are employed in a steadily growing number of districts. When a procedure proves 
to be very effective, system-wide adoption in the Federal Rules probably will be 
warranted. 
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Congress can rely on several sources for this broad approach. 
Experimentation with court-annexed arbitration, which some 
districts instituted in the late 1970s and which Congress ap-
proved during the 1980s and codified in the 1988 Judicial Im-
provements Act, is one helpful illustration. 76 Because the CJRA 
expressly provides for the EIDCs, however, they are most di-
rectly applicable. These courts comprise thirty-six percent of 
the ninety-four districts. Moreover, the EIDCs are sufficiently 
diverse and representative in terms, for example, of geography, 
local legal culture, and the procedures adopted. The EIDCs have 
also undertaken enough implementation to serve as effective 
crucibles for experimentation. 
The thirty-four courts which are EIDCs nevertheless may be 
too numerous for efficacious experimentation and evaluation. If 
Congress finds that to be true, it could easily select an appro-
priate subset. For instance, Congress might choose a group, 
sufficiently small in number, yet large enough to be represen-
tative and to provide sufficiently informative insights. Existing 
subsets are the five demonstration77 and ten pilot districts78 that 
the Act created and the twenty "volunteer" EIDCs that satisfied 
the CJRA's requirements.79 Congress might designate certain 
demonstration districts in terms of specific procedures with 
which they are experimenting. so Congress could base the selec-
tion of pilot districts, for example, on their statutorily mandated 
composition as metropolitan or rural districts.81 Congress may 
premise its choice of volunteer districts, for instance, on the 
criteria suggested for demonstration or pilot districts. 
Congress should at least extend the effective date by which 
the remaining districts that are not EIDCs must adopt plans, 
thereby enabling evaluators to analyze rigorously the effective-
76 See 28 u.s.c. §§ 651-658; BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRA-
TION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1990). 
77 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 104. 
78 Id.§ 105. 
79 Id. § 103(c); see also supra note 12 (listing demonstration, pilot, and volunteer 
EIDCs). 
80 There are only five demonstration districts. Congress instructed two to "experiment 
with systems of differentiated case management" and three to "experiment with various 
methods of reducing cost and delay in civil litigation." Judicial Improvements Act of 
1990 § 104(b). 
81 
"At least five of the Pilot Districts designated by the Judicial Conference shall be 
judicial districts encompassing metropolitan areas," and the "plans implemented by the 
Pilot Districts shall include the six principles and guidelines of litigation management 
and cost and delay reduction" in 28 U.S.C. § 473(a). Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 
§ 105(b)(l)-(2). 
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ness of the procedures which the EIDCs are applying. This 
would permit all districts to make more educated decisions 
about which procedures are most workable. If Congress does 
not extend the effective date, the advisory groups that are com-
piling reports and recommendations and the districts which are 
developing plans should delay their efforts as much as possible, 
thus facilitating consideration of the maximum information prior 
to finalizing their work. The groups and districts should wait as 
late as practicable in 1993 in order to have the benefit of two 
annual assessments which most of the EIDCs would have com-
piled by then. 82 
Finally, Congress should expeditiously clarify whether and, 
if so, the extent to which, districts can promulgate procedures 
that conflict with ones which other districts prescribe or with 
the Federal Rules or provisions of the United States Code. 
Congress should precisely delineate the breadth of the districts' 
authority to promulgate inconsistent procedures under the 
CJRA and must sharply circumscribe the power which the 
courts have asserted. The complications that these conflicts and 
expansive assertions of power create simply outweigh the value 
of broader experimentation. A measured approach which 
properly balances the needs for procedural certainty and con-
sistency and for effective experimentation is readily available: 
the recently withdrawn proposal to amend Rule 83 which would 
have permitted districts to experiment with inconsistent proce-
dures for appropriately limited periods subject to Judicial Con-
ference approval. 83 Congress should concomitantly seek to re-
duce interdistrict disuniformity by, for example, restricting the 
number of procedures that districts might adopt or limiting the 
extent to which courts can rely on the sixth, open-ended tech-
nique which permits them to prescribe such other procedures 
as the districts consider appropriate in reducing cost and delay. 84 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Civil justice reform has been highly controversial. Nonethe-
less, preliminary civil justice planning in the EIDCs under the 
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 475. The suggestions in the last two sentences are directed more 
to the advisory groups and the districts than to Congress. The recommendations, 
however, are relevant to Congress because they are meant to improve implementation. 
83 See supra note 58. 
84 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6). Numerous courts apparently have relied on that provision 
to adopt procedures that are inconsistent or questionable as a matter of authority or 
policy. See Tobias, Balkanization. suora note 6 (manns.,rint M l'i-l7l 
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Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 has had considerable promise. 
If Congress implements the suggestions above, it can maximize 
the beneficial features of this reform effort. With a streamlined 
approach to planning, Congress should be able to realize the 
reform's potential and achieve the statutory goals of reducing 
expense and delay in federal civil litigation. 
